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mutual	 respect,	 in	 situations	 of	 political	 disagreement	 (Gutmann	 &	 Thompson,	 1996).	 While	
normative	democratic	theorists	have	long	been	insistent	on	the	importance	of	these	values,	they	
have	 also	 expressed	 strong	 suspicion	 towards	 the	 capacity	 of	 political	 parties—central	 to	 the	
functioning	of	liberal	democratic	regimes—to	be	carriers	of	this	pluralist	ideal	(for	an	overview	
see	 Ball,	 1989;	 Hofstadter,	 1969;	 Rosenblum,	 2008).	 Instead,	 starting	with	 the	 18th	 century	
criticisms	by	Bolingbroke	of	 the	 evils	 of	 "faction"	up	 to	Rawls'	 contemporary	dismissal	 of	 the	
"great	 game	 of	 politics"	 (Muirhead	 &	Rosenblum,	 2006),	 political	 thinkers	 have	 shunned	 the	
divisive	influence	of	political	parties	on	society,	rooted	in	the	intransigent	and	partial	nature	of	
the	partisan	passion.		
In	 the	 past	 decade,	 a	 number	 of	 democratic	 theorists	 have	 aimed	 to	 rehabilitate	
partisanship	as	a	normative	category,	and	thus	account	 for	what	 'good	partisanship'	entails	in	
democratic	societies	(Bonotti,	2012,	2014,	2019;	Bonotti	et	al.,	2018;	Herman,	2017;	Herman	&	
Muirhead,	 Forthcoming;	 Invernizzi-Accetti	 &	 Wolkenstein,	 2017;	 Muirhead,	 2006,	 2014;	










how	we	could	recognise	pluralist	partisanship	 in	political	practice,	and	 the	degree	 to	which	 it	
constitutes	an	attainable	ideal	for	real-world	partisans.	For	this	purpose,	I	conduct	a	micro-level	







pluralism,	 but	 also	 their	 capacity	 to	 do	 so	 at	 a	 stringent	 level.	 The	 paper	 more	 generally	
contributes	to	the	field	of	party	studies	by	providing	innovative	theoretical	and	methodological	
tools	to	analyse	a	key	dimension	of	the	democratic	performance	of	political	parties:	their	capacity	
to	 advance	 norms	 of	 political	 tolerance.	 Finally,	 it	 advances	 democratic	 theory	 by	 offering	
evidence	 that	 pluralist	 partisanship	 is	 not	 an	 unattainable	 ideal,	 thus	 nuancing	 longstanding	
assumptions	in	political	philosophy	on	the	necessarily	intransigent	and	divisive	character	of	the	
partisan	passion.		









Much	 of	 normative	 democratic	 theory	 shares	 an	 appreciation	 for	 the	 importance	 of	 a	
pluralist	orientation	in	liberal	politics.	(see	among	many	others	Cruickshank,	2014;	Galston,	2002,	







accounts	 of	 the	moral	 universe.	 These	 claim	 that	 the	 latter	 is	 ordered	according	 to	 a	 unique,	
definitive	and	exclusive	account	of	the	common	good	(Galston,	2002,	p.	6).		
	 In	 this	 tradition	of	 thought	pluralist	commitments	are	central	to	 the	 liberal	democratic	
worldview	 or	 ethos.	 As	 argued	 by	 Lefort,	 "the	 revolutionary	 and	 unprecedented	 feature	 of	
democracy	(is	that)	the	locus	of	power	becomes	an	empty	place	(...)	it	is	such	that	not	individual	
and	no	group	can	be	consubstantiated	with	it"	(Lefort,	1988,	p.	16).	At	the	heart	of	this	mutation	
of	 symbolic	 power	 is	 a	 moral	 revolution,	 "instituted	 and	 sustained	 by	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	
markers	of	certainty"	(Lefort,	1988,	p.	19).	Power	cannot	be	permanently	occupied	in	a	world	
characterised	by	indeterminacy,	where	no	claim	to	the	good	is	accepted	as	complete	and	definitive.	
A	 commitment	 to	 pluralism	 is	 thus	 an	 endorsement	 of	 the	 most	 basic	 principle	 of	 liberal	
democracy:	 that	 the	moral	 universe	 is	 characterised	 by	 a	 plurality	 of	 legitimate	 claims	 to	 the	
common	 good,	 and	 that,	 consequently,	 the	 political	 authority	 devolved	 through	 elections	 is	
necessarily	and	always	of	a	provisional	nature.		
These	 principles	 have	 specific	 implications	 for	 the	ways	 in	which	 democratic	 subjects	








whose	 right	 to	defend	those	 ideas	we	do	not	put	 into	question"	 (Mouffe,	2000,	pp.	 101-102)	
Deliberative	 approaches	 also	 view	 'reciprocity'	 as	 a	 key	 condition	 for	 democratic	 subjects	 to	
deliberate	in	the	face	of	moral	disagreement,	a	condition	that	involves	viewing	opponents	as	both	
'competent	subjects'	and	'moral	and	political	equals'	(Gutmann	&	Thompson,	1996,	p.	17).	
The	 pluralist	 requirements	 that	 we	 demand	 from	 citizens	 need	 to	 be	 both	 carefully	




within	 which	 pluralist	 commitments	 should	 express	 themselves	 in	 a	 liberal	 democracy	 and,	








key	 administrative	positions—lends	 them	significantly	 larger	 amounts	of	 political	power	 than	
other	citizens	(Herman	&	Muirhead,	Forthcoming).	In	Bonotti’s	formulation,	this	creates	positional	
duties	for	partisans,	specific	legal	and	non-legal	obligations	attached	to	their	level	of	responsibility	
within	 liberal	 democracy	 (Bonotti,	 2012,	 2018).	 Chief	 among	 their	 democratic	 obligations	 is	
precisely	a	commitment	to	a	pluralist	worldview.	For	citizens	with	such	strong	political	beliefs,	




only	 "operate	within	 an	agreed-on	 constitutional	 framework"	but	are	 instead	 "active,	 avowed,	
intentional	agents"	in	support	of	the	liberal	democratic	regime	(Rosenblum,	2008,	pp.	124,	363).	
While	 this	 recent	 body	 of	 literature	 follows	 the	 well-accepted	 view	 that	 pluralist	





scale	models	 of	 decision-making	 (see	 for	 example	 Barber,	 1984;	 Saward,	 2007,	 part	 VII).	 A	
similar	statement	applies	to	Rawlsian	political	theory	and	much	of	the	'deliberative	turn'	of	the	











1	The	 "systemic"	 turn	 in	 deliberative	 democratic	 theory	 (Mansbridge,	Bohman,	&	Chambers,	 2012)	 has	
nevertheless	 led	 to	 study	aspects	 of	 the	 representative	process,	 and	national	 level	 'mass	 politics'	more	
generally	 in	 light	 of	 deliberative	 principles—with	 some	 emphasis	 on	 the	 inclusive	 effects	 of	 parties		
(Chambers,	1998;	Steiner,	Bächtiger,	Spörndli,	&	Steenbergen,	2004).	A	few	important	contributions	have	
recently	focused	specifically	on	the	capacity	of	partisanship	to	act	as	a	vector	for	deliberative	principles	(see	
for	 instance	 Invernizzi-Accetti	 &	Wolkenstein,	 2017;	 Teorell,	 1999;	 Wolkenstein,	 2015,	 2016a,	 2016b,	
2019).	
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pluralist	 orientations	 for	 liberal	 democracy,	 do	 not	 expect	 such	 commitments	 from	 partisans.	
Beyond	their	normative	positioning,	 these	 two	schools	make	assumptions	about	 the	nature	of	
partisanship	 in	 real-world	 politics:	 that	 it	 is	 either	 possible	 for	 partisans	 to	 uphold	 pluralist	
principles	or	that,	a	contrario,	lack	of	tolerance	for	opposing	views	is	in	the	very	nature	of	partisan	
conviction.	These	opposing	views	thus	raise	key	empirical	questions:	To	what	extent	does	 the	








an	overview,	 see	Herman,	2017;	Herman	&	Muirhead,	 Forthcoming).	The	very	 engagement	of	
partisans	is	rooted	in	the	conviction	that	their	own	ideas	and	policies	are	superior	to	those	of	their	
	 8	
opponents	 (Rosenblum,	 2008,	 p.	 358).	 To	 engage	 citizens,	 and	 offer	 them	 meaningful	
alternatives	to	choose	from,	partisans	need	to	argue	the	superiority	of	their	own	program	and	
criticise	 their	 opponents'	 platform	 (Mouffe,	 2005;	 White	 &	 Ypi,	 2011,	 2016).	 Partisans	
committed	 to	 political	 pluralism	 will	 engage	 in	 such	 necessary	 opposition	 while	 displaying	
respectful	 attitudes	 towards	 political	 opponents.	 Respect	 for	 opponents	 is	 here	 an	 active	
recognition	of	the	legitimacy	of	opponents	in	formulating	contradictory	claims	stemming	from	the	
fact	that	they	are	recognised	as	equals	in	an	inclusive	and	pluralist	political	community	(Gutmann	
&	 Thompson,	 2010).	 Expressing	 such	 respect	means	placing	 our	 opponents'	 right	 to	disagree	
above	our	conviction	in	the	superiority	of	our	own	claims.		
This	 study	 relies	 on	 three	 criteria	 to	 distinguish	 between	 respectful	 and	 disrespectful	
attitudes	 towards	 political	 opponents,	 building	 on	my	 previous	 work	 (Herman,	 2017).	 In	 the	
empirical	 analysis	 below	 these	 criteria	 will	 be	 discussed	 at	 greater	 length,	 along	 with	 the	
indicators	associated	with	them:	
• Criterion	1:	Refraining	from	motive-cynicism:	A	first	sign	of	respect	for	political	opponents	
can	 be	 found	 in	 the	 types	 of	 criticisms	 that	 partisans	 address	 their	 opposition.	 Respectful	
opposition	involves	criticising	the	practices	of	opponents	rather	than	their	intentions.	In	other	
















This	 study	 explores	 these	 different	 forms	 of	 respect	 for	 political	 opposition	 in	 the	











There	 are	 likely	 to	 be	 variations	 in	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 real-world	 partisans	 uphold	
pluralist	ideals	across	different	countries,	parties	or	 individual	partisans.	However,	 there	 is	no	
accepted	scale	of	pluralist	commitments	to	place	the	discourse	of	a	given	partisan	actor	on	and	











widely	 accepted,	 institutional	 standards	 for	 democratic	 compliance	 (Freedom	 House,	 2013a,	
2013b),	 a	 discrepancy	 that	 has	 only	 widened	 since	 (Freedom	 House,	 2019a,	 2019b).	 While	




these	 contrasting	 democratic	 contexts,	 both	 electoral	 systems	 have	 a	 strong	 majoritarian	
component,	 resulting	at	the	 time	of	study	 in	highly	polarised	dynamics	between	the	 two	main	









local	youth	sections	of	 the	 four	above-mentioned	parties,	or	 their	close	 electoral	allies.4	Seven	






























Satirical	 images	were	 used	 in	 France	 and	more	 illustrative	 pictures	 in	 Hungary	 because	 there	was	 no	






From	 left	 to	 right:	Maintaining	 and	 reforming	 the	 public	 service;	 Relations	 to	 the	EU;	Religious	and/or	
national	 minorities;	 Institutional	 reforms;	 Justice	 and	 security;	 The	 fight	 against	 unemployment	 and	
employment	 policy;	 The	 place	 of	 the	Nation	 in	 Politics;	 Public	morality;	 Industrial	 and/or	 agricultural	




From	 left	 to	 right:	Maintaining	 and	 reforming	 the	 public	 service;	 Relations	 to	 the	EU;	Religious	and/or	
national	minorities;	Sexual	minorities	and	social	change;	Justice	and	security;	Legal	and	illegal	immigration;	
The	fight	against	unemployment	and	employment	policy;	Public	morality;	Industrial	and/or	agricultural	
politics;	 Fiscal	 policy,	 social	 policy	 and	 redistribution	 of	 wealth;	 Financing	 the	 public	 debt	 and	 deficit;	
Environmental	politics.	
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between	 different	 discussions,	 as	 participants	 can	 exercise	 their	 freedom	 within	 the	 clearly	





their	opponents.	 In	 talking	about	what	set	their	own	party	apart	 from	their	opposition	on	 the	
topics	under	discussion,	participants	also	criticised	and	valued	their	opponents	in	different	ways.	
This	 allowed	 me	 to	 subsequently	 analyse	 how	 they	 talked	 about	 their	 opponents	 in	 light	 of	
pluralist	standards.		
	 14	
The	 28	 group	 discussions	 were	 transcribed	 verbatim	 and	 coded	 using	 text-analysis	
software	NVivo	to	ensure	a	systematic	approach.6	I	designed	the	coding	scheme	in	such	a	way	as	
to	explore	how	the	discourse	of	partisans	relates	to	the	three	criteria	outlined	above.	In	analysing	








have	 to	 say	 or	 do	 something	 (Gutmann	 &	 Thompson,	 2010,	 p.	 1133;	 Herman,	 2017).	 Such	
accusations	may	range	from	simple	references	to	the	vote-seeking	attitude	of	opponents,	to	more	
serious	accusations	of	being	corrupt	and	moved	solely	by	material	gain.	Partisans	who	respect	
political	 opponents	 refrain	 from	 such	 arguments	 as	 they	 start	 from	 the	 assumption	 that	 the	
motives	of	those	who	engage	with	politics,	including	their	own,	are	always	mixed.	Questioning	in	





A	specific	code	was	attributed	 to	 instances	where	partisans	criticised	 the	 intentions	of	
their	political	opponents	(ILL	INTENTIONS)	and	another	to	instances	where	they	focused	on	their	





































































would	 regularly	 target	 the	 PS	 for	 adopting	 counter-productive	 measures	 to	 tackle	 shared	







Instances	 in	 which	 participants	 criticised	 their	 opponents'	 intentions	 (coded	 ILL-
INTENTIONS)	were	grouped	into	two	categories.	First,	cases	where	participants	criticised	their	
opponents	for	looking	out	for	the	political	interest	of	their	party,	and	especially	their	re-election,	




or	 supporters,	 or	 of	 being	 under	 the	 influence	 of	 certain	 sectorial	 interests	 (PERSONAL	
INTERESTS).	 Accusations	 of	 corruption,	 cronyism	 and	 nepotism	would	 fall	 under	 this	 second	
category.	The	second	type	of	criticisms	may	be	considered	as	more	problematic	from	a	pluralist	
perspective	than	the	first.	Indeed,	to	pursue	purely	personal	goals	in	politics	is	not	only	morally	










Figure	 4:	 Types	 of	 criticisms	 by	 French	 and	 Hungarian	 participants	 of	 their	 opponents'	
intentions	
As	 shown	 in	 Figure	 4,	 26%	 of	 French	 criticisms	 of	 intentions	 focus	 on	 the	 personal	
motivations	of	 opponents,	 for	 instance	 their	 quest	 for	material	 interest	 or	personal	 influence.	
French	participants	 focus	more	on	 the	political	motivations	of	 their	 opponents,	 in	most	 cases	
accusing	them	of	adopting	certain	policies	or	certain	discourses	out	of	pure	concern	for	electoral	
support.	 The	 proportion	 of	 criticisms	 targeting	 the	 political	 and	 personal	 motivations	 of	




















































The	 second	 criterion	 for	 respectful	 discourse	 is	an	 acknowledgement	of	 the	principled	





in	 the	 morality	 of	 opposition.	 Indeed,	 why	 would	 disagreements	 persist	 in	 the	 face	 of	 joint	
commitment	 to	 the	 common	 good?	 The	 pluralist	 response	 to	 this	 question	 attributes	 the	
persistence	 of	 political	 disagreements	 to	 different	 understandings	 of	 the	 exact	 content	 of	 the	
'common	good',	and	of	its	practical	implications.		
To	explore	this	criterion,	instances	where	partisans	talk	about	the	values,	policy	objectives	
and	 ideologies	 of	 their	 political	 opponents	 have	 been	 coded	 (coded	 IDEAS	 and	 OPPONENT-
FOCUSED)	and	compared	with	instances	in	which	partisans	talk	about	their	own	values,	policy	
objectives	and	ideologies	(coded	IDEAS	and	SELF-FOCUSED).	If	we	take	this	as	an	indicator	of	the	










































































Marcel:	 (...)	 There	 are	 people	 who	 were	 deeply	 opposed	 (to	 the	 law),	 it’s	 not	 my	 position,	 but	 I	 can	










they	are	 talking	about	 their	own	platforms	(see	Figure	5).	While	 instances	where	participants	
explicitly	negated	the	principled-nature	of	their	opponents	were	not	specifically	coded	for,	 it	 is	















Much	 like	 Fidesz-KDNP	 participants,	 MSzP-Együtt	 participants	 would	 also	 picture	
principles	claimed	by	 their	opponents	as	convenient	electoral	bait	serving	more	base	motives.	



















and	 the	 preservation	 of	 democracy's	 'procedural	minimum'	 (Galston,	 2013).	 On	 the	 contrary,	





At	 the	 very	 least,	 partisans	 that	 meet	 this	 criterion	 will	 refrain	 from	 picturing	 their	
opponents	as	immoral.	Two	main	codes	are	relevant	here.	First,	the	code	MORAL	DEFFICIENCY	





functioning	 of	 the	 democratic	 regime	 itself.	 These	 indirect	 ways	 of	 questioning	 opponents'	










used	 in	 French	 group	 discussions,	 but	 these	 also	 contain	 a	 few	 instances	 in	 which	 French	









































































topics	 they	 were	 least	 likely	 to	 classify	 as	 conflictual:	 they	 did	 so	 in	 only	 23.7%	 of	 their	
classifications	 of	 this	 card,	 against	 a	 51.8%	 average	 of	 conflictual	 card	 classifications.	 French	






































































































The	 empirical	 analysis	 reveals	 striking	 differences	 between	 French	 and	 Hungarian	
attitudes	 towards	 political	 opponents	 throughout	 all	 criteria	 considered,	 French	 partisans	
consistently	displaying	greater	respect	for	political	opponents	as	compared	to	their	Hungarian	
counterparts.	 While	 French	 participants	 refrain	 from	 targeting	 their	 opponents'	 motives,	
Hungarian	activists	repeatedly	engage	in	motive	cynicism.	Many	French	partisans	recognise	and	
declare	 as	 legitimate	 the	 principles	 of	 their	 opponents;	 conversely	 Hungarian	 participants	
regularly	 deny	 that	 opponents	 have	 any	principles	 at	 all.	 Finally,	 in	 France	 interviewees	 very	











norms	 in	 democratic	 life.	 Anti-pluralist	 discourse	 in	Hungary	 is	 associated	with	 anti-pluralist	
practices:	the	abuses	of	power	by	ruling	party	Fidesz	since	2010	(Freedom	House,	2019b;	Pech	&	
Scheppele,	 2017)	 can	 be	 read	 as	 a	 progressive	 translation	 into	 governmental	 practice	 of	 the	
strongly	polarized	political	discourse	dominant	in	the	Hungarian	political	environment	since	the	
early	2000s	(Herman,	2016;	Palonen,	2009).	This	suggests	the	particular	importance	of	studying	




democratic	 functions	of	partisans,	especially	 their	responsibility	 to	uphold	norms	of	pluralism	
while	providing	citizens	with	reasons	to	engage	with	representative	politics	(on	this	second	key	







and	 theoretical	 work	 on	 the	 potential	 trade-off	 between	 advancing	 pluralist	 norms	 and	
communicating	 strong	 convictions	 capable	 of	 engaging	 citizens,	 the	 two	 main	 functions	 that	
contemporary	democratic	theory	ascribes	to	partisanship	(for	an	overview,	see	Herman,	2017).			
The	wide	variations	in	pluralist	norms	revealed	here	also	suggest	that	the	form	taken	by	







allow	 empiricists	 to	 document	 these	 real-world	 variations	 and	 explain	 their	 roots	 in	 a	more	
systematic	manner,	normative	thinkers	should	also	consider	how	contextual	determinants	impact	
what	can	be	expected	from	partisans.		
Finally,	 and	 relatedly,	 these	 results	 invite	 theorists	 to	 consider	 whether	 all	 partisans	
should	be	held	to	the	same	pluralist	standards	or	whether	other	normative	imperatives	should	be	
weighed	 against	 the	 pluralist	 ideal	 in	 certain	 situations.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 this	 study,	 it	 is	
questionable	whether	it	is	normatively	desirable	for	MSzP	partisans	to	treat	their	opponents	as	
legitimate	 contenders	pursuing	 the	 common	good,	when	 the	 actions	of	 Fidesz	 since	2010	are	
widely	acknowledged	as	damaging	to	the	rule	of	law,	fuelling	systemic	cronyism	and	state	capture	
by	partisan	elites.	In	this	particular	case,	should	we	hold	MSzP	partisans	to	the	same	norms	of	






norms	 of	 political	 discourse	 that	 should	 guide	 handling	disloyal	political	 parties	 that	 are	 also	
major	 political	 forces.	 These	 questions	 are	 crucial	 in	many	 young	 democracies	 facing	 similar	
issues	as	Hungary,	but	also	 in	more	established	democracies	where	populist	parties	with	anti-
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